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THE DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECT ON NATIVE 
AMERICAN WOMEN OF EXTENDING THE FEDERAL 
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER ACT TO INCLUDE A 
WOMAN’S CONDUCT AGAINST HER CHILD IN UTERO: 




I raise up my voice—not so that I can shout, but so that those 
without a voice can be heard . . . . We cannot all succeed when 
half of us are held back. 
—Malala Yousafzai 
I. Introduction  
Samantha Flute, a Native American woman, was charged with 
committing involuntary manslaughter against her newborn baby boy after it 
was revealed that she took over-the-counter and prescription drugs shortly 
before delivery.
1
 Although the District Court for the District of South 
Dakota dismissed the charges, the Eighth Circuit found that the Federal 
Involuntary Manslaughter Act (FIMA) included a woman’s prenatal actions 
that caused the death of her born-alive child.
2
 Flute’s case is one of first 
impression as these actions and particular circumstances have never before 




This Note will explore the Eighth Circuit’s holding to determine whether 
the FIMA should be extended to cover actions, such as Flute’s, which result 
in the death of a newborn child. Additionally, this Note will explore how 
the Flute holding, as it stands, disproportionately affects Native American 
women compared to the rest of the population. Considerations such as 
culture and healthcare will demonstrate that, under the holding in Flute, 
Native American women face further oppression. Part II of this Note lays 
out the pertinent legal history of federal jurisdiction over Native Americans. 
In Part III, this Note summarizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Flute. Finally, Part IV interprets the FIMA as it should be applied 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 585–86 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 2. Id. at 589. 
 3. Id. at 591 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
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in this situation and further analyzes the effect of the Flute holding on 
Native American women.  
II. A Perfect Storm: The Statutory Basis for Flute’s Conviction 
A. Federal Jurisdiction  
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1153, known as the Major Crimes Act, in 
1885.
4
 The Act was adopted in response to the decision in Ex parte Crow 
Dog, where an Indian-against-Indian murder conviction prosecuted under 
the General Crimes Act was overturned due to the Indian-against-Indian 
exception of the General Crimes Act.
5
 Conversely, the Major Crimes Act 
sought to confer criminal jurisdiction to the United States over serious 
crimes that “might otherwise go unpunished under [the] tribal criminal 
justice system[].”
6
 As a result, the Major Crimes Act now federally 
criminalizes a list of enumerated crimes committed by one Indian against 
another Indian.
7
 The Major Crimes Act provides that “[a]ny Indian who 
commits against . . . another Indian . . . any of the following offenses . . . 
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as 
all other persons committing . . . the above offenses, within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States.”
8
 
Flute’s actions, if considered to be involuntary manslaughter, fall within 
the purview of the Major Crimes Act; Flute and her baby, the victim of the 
crime, are Native American.
9
 Additionally, Flute committed the act in 
Agency village, which is within Indian Country.
10
 Thus, because the 
conduct falls within the domain of the Major Crimes Act and occurred 





                                                                                                             
 4. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 5. CONF. OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 4:9 (2020 ed.), 
AILDKBK § 4:9 (Westlaw) [hereinafter DESKBOOK] (citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 
556 (1883)). 
 6. United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 7. DESKBOOK, supra note 5; 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 
 9. Redacted Indictment, United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 
5495170 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
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B. Involuntary Manslaughter 
Flute was indicted for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112, 
the FIMA.
12
 The FIMA defines involuntary manslaughter as “the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice . . . [i]n the commission of an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful 
manner, or without due caution . . . of a lawful act which might produce 
death.”
13
 The prosecution believed that Flute’s actions fell within this 
definition and a grand jury returned an indictment under the Act.
14
  
The United States alleged that Flute “unlawfully killed a human being, 
Baby [] Flute, without malice, in the commission of a lawful act in an 
unlawful manner which might produce death.”
15
 Involuntary manslaughter 
caused by negligence has been interpreted to mean a “wanton or reckless 
disregard for human life.”
16
 To be characterized as involuntary, this 
negligent killing must be unintentional and must not be of such a reckless 
disregard for human life that it would “support a finding of malice.”
17
 
Additionally, to support a conviction under the Act, the prosecution must 
prove the responsible party “had actual knowledge that [the] conduct was a 
threat to the lives of others, or to have knowledge of such circumstances as 
could . . . have made foreseeable . . . the peril to which [the] acts might 
subject others.”
18
 Neither the intent nor the malice of the defendant is 
considered a factor needed to establish involuntary manslaughter.
19
 
Flute did not believe her conduct fit within the requisite elements of the 
FIMA; therefore, she moved to dismiss the charges after her indictment.
20
 
Flute contended that, in reading the involuntary manslaughter statute, 
neither the class of victims protected nor the class of defendants sought to 
be criminalized includes mothers and newborn children injured in utero.
21
 
Rather, the Act only mentions that “victims” refers to human beings who 
are unlawfully killed.
22
 The definition of “human being” in reference to 
                                                                                                             
 12. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 
 14. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. United States v. Blount, 514 F. App’x 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 17. United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Lesina, 833 F.2d 156, 159 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368, 374 (4th Cir. 1966). 
 19. Id. at 373. 
 20. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 21. Id. at 586.  
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 
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infants is set out in 1 U.S.C. § 8, the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act 
(BAIPA), which applies broadly to all acts of Congress.
23
 Moreover, the 
BAIPA does not set out any specific exception for actions of mothers when 
the victim is their own child.
24
 The broad implications of the BAIPA create 
ambiguities when considering the BAIPA in conjunction with other acts 
like the FIMA, as in this case. In light of this, statutory interpretation 
determines whether Flute’s conduct meets all of the requisite elements of 
the federal involuntary manslaughter offense.  
C. Healthcare in Indian Country 
Historically, the federal government has recognized an obligation to 
provide healthcare to Native Americans as a result of treaties and 
agreements between the government and Native tribes throughout the 
country.
25
 As early as the nineteenth century, the United States began to 
provide “modest provisions for health care” for Native Americans in an 
effort to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.
26
 In 1921, Congress 
enacted 25 U.S.C. § 13, known as the Snyder Act, which authorized the 
federal government to fund and enact various Indian programs for purposes 
such as “relief of distress and conservation of health.”
27
 This Act authorized 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to expend only for the named purposes 
and provided that “Congress may from time to time appropriate, for . . . 
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States” instead of 
guaranteeing any specific service to Native Americans.
28
 The Snyder Act’s 
vague authorization of funds resulted in inconsistent and meager federally 
provided healthcare for Native Americans.
29
 This continued until the 1950s 
                                                                                                             
 23. 1 U.S.C. § 8. This Act provides that for any Act of Congress that uses the words 
“‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘child’, and ‘individual’,” the meaning of such words includes 
“every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of 
development.” Id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Koral E. Fusselman, Note, Native American Health Care: Is the Indian Health Care 
Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2009 Enough to Address Persistent Health 
Problems Within the Native American Community?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 389, 394 (2012). 
 26. Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How to Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy, 
and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 368–69 (1996). 
 27. 25 U.S.C. § 13; see also Fusselman, supra note 25, at 395. 
 28. 25 U.S.C. § 13. 
 29. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 26, at 376–77, 386; see Fusselman, supra note 25, 
at 395 (“[T]he Act failed to define specific programs for assistance and eligibility 
requirements, and did not represent a general entitlement to services.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss1/6
No. 1] NOTES 195 
 
 
when new legislation transferred the responsibility of Indian medical 
services from the BIA to the Department of Health, Education, and 




Despite this change in responsibility, there remained a severe need for 
healthcare improvements as the “health status of Native Americans was far 
below that of the general population.”
31
 In 1976, the Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act sought to improve the health of Native Americans by 
implementing various health programs and services.
32
 The Act specifically 
recognized that the United States has a “special responsibilit[y] and legal 
obligation to the American Indian people, to meet the national goal of 
providing the highest possible health status to Indians and to provide 
existing Indian health services with all resources necessary.”
33
  
Since the enactment of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, there 
has been an expansion in healthcare programs and healthcare access for 
Native Americans, but problems and shortfalls of the Indian Health Service 
still remain.
34
 One shortfall is the fact that Native Americans are subject to 
limitations as a result of the control the federal government has over the 
Indian Health Service. Despite the recognition that healthcare for Native 
Americans is a historical obligation of the federal government, Native 
American healthcare is subject to the same congressional limitations as 
government-provided healthcare.
35
 In particular, Native American women 
may not receive abortions through the Indian Health Service, due to the 
enactment of the Hyde Amendment, just as women receiving Medicaid may 
not. 
                                                                                                             
 30. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 395; Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 26, at 382. 
 31. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 396. 
 32. Id.; Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 3, 90 Stat. 1400, 
1401 (1976) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1602). 
 33. Indian Health Care Improvement Act § 3, 90 Stat. at 1401. 
 34. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the shortage of health professionals on 
reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to “adequately address the health needs 
of local Native Americans.”). 
 35. Congress has restricted the use of federal funds for abortions by the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Indian Health Service. Infra note 45 and accompanying 
text. As the Department of Health and Human Services is the funding mechanism for 
Medicare and Medicaid, government-provided healthcare likewise does not cover abortions. 
How is Medicare funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-is-
medicare-funded#:~:text=The%20Centers%20for%20Medicare%20%26%20Medicaid,and 
%20Human%20Services%20(HHS).&text=This%20money%20comes%20from%20the%20
Medicare%20Trust%20Funds (last visited Dec 2, 2020). 
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D. The Hyde Amendment 
In 1976, the Hyde Amendment was added to the annual Health and 
Human Services Appropriations Bill.
36
 The original Amendment provided 
that no funds appropriated to the Department of Health could be “used to 
perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered 
if the fetus were carried to term.”
37
 Subsequently, Congress broadened the 
Hyde Amendment to include an exception allowing for the use of federal 
funds for abortions when “necessary for the victims of rape or incest” or 
“the termination of an ectopic pregnancy.”
38
 Despite challenges to the Hyde 
Amendment in consideration of the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court, in Harris v. McRae, 
held the Hyde Amendment to be constitutional in accordance with the Fifth 
Amendment.
39
 Today, the Hyde Amendment still stands for the same 
proposition: federally allocated funds may not be used for abortions, except 
in the narrow circumstances of rape, incest, ectopic pregnancy, or other 
instances where the mother’s life is endangered.
40
 
Since the Hyde Amendment was specifically targeted at cutting off the 
federal funding of abortions for women on Medicaid,
41
 it did not affect 
Native American women until later on. It was not until 2008 that the Senate 
realized there was a loophole in the Hyde Amendment caused by its 
intersection with the funding mechanism for the Indian Health Service. 
Because the Hyde Amendment provided that “[n]one of the funds contained 
in [the] Act” could be used for abortions, the Amendment did not apply, at 
that time, to the funds allocated to the Indian Health Service through a 
different act.
42
 In 2008, the Senate proposed an amendment to the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act extending the Hyde Amendment’s 
application to the Indian Health Service as well.
43
 
The Senate approved the Indian Health Care Improvement Act’s 
amendment and, shortly thereafter, added a provision that limited the use of 
                                                                                                             
 36. Senate Moves to Bar Abortion Funding from Indian Health Care Bill, 15 Andrews 
Health L. Litig. Rep. (West) No. 11, at 10, 10, 2008 WL 780623 at *1 (Mar. 26, 2008).  
 37. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 94-439, sec. 209, 90 
Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976). 
 38. Act of Oct. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-369, sec. 110, 94 Stat. 1351, 1356 (providing 
continuing appropriations for the fiscal year of 1981). 
 39. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980). 
 40. Act of Oct. 1, 1980 sec. 110, 94 Stat. at 1356. 
 41. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill sec. 209, 90 Stat. at 1434. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Senate Moves to Bar Abortion Funding from Indian Health Care Bill, supra note 36. 
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funds by the Indian Health Service to the Indian Health Care Improvement 
Act.
44
 The new amendment provided that any limitations contained in “an 
Act providing appropriations for the Department of Health and Human 
Services . . . with respect to the performance of abortions shall apply . . . 
with respect to . . . using funds contained in an Act providing appropriations 
for the Indian Health Service.”
45
  
These various pieces of legislation play an important role in Flute’s 
conviction of federal involuntary manslaughter, discussed in Part IV(B) of 
this Note. The Major Crimes Act and the FIMA are the Eighth Circuit’s 
basis for convicting Flute. The legislation surrounding Indian healthcare 
and the Hyde Amendment are relevant to the proposition that Native 
American women are disproportionately affected by the Eighth Circuit’s 
holding in Flute. This legislation created the “perfect storm” for defendant 
Flute.  
III. The Case: United States v. Flute 
Flute gave birth to a baby boy on August 19, 2016 at a hospital in 
Sisseton, South Dakota.
46
 Baby Flute was born full-term at thirty-eight 
weeks; he was seemingly healthy “with no obvious signs of trauma or 
injury.”
47
 Despite this fact, Baby Flute died four hours after birth.
48
 While 
efforts were made to resuscitate Baby Flute, the mother admitted to abusing 
several over-the-counter and prescription drugs immediately prior to her 
admission to the hospital for Baby Flute’s delivery.
49
 Specifically, Flute 
told the doctors she: (1) took “three times the daily dose of Lorazepam,” a 
drug prescribed to her during a prenatal medical visit; (2) snorted 
hydrocodone, which she believed was laced with cocaine due to the feeling 
it gave her; and (3) drank cough medicine.
50
  
When Flute was initially admitted for delivery, lab results indicated she 
tested positive for “cocaine and a number of prescription and over-the-
counter drugs.”
51
 Additionally, Flute admitted she was aware that ingesting 
these substances could hurt Baby Flute, but did so anyway because “she 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. 
 45. 25 U.S.C. § 1676. 
 46. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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needed to get high.”
52
 Baby Flute’s autopsy confirmed the presence of 
substances that had not been administered to him during the time he was 
alive at the hospital.
53
 The pathologist who conducted the autopsy 
concluded that Baby Flute died from the drug toxicity of the substances 
ingested by his mother just prior to his birth.
54
 
Samantha Flute was indicted on March 15, 2017 on one count of 
involuntary manslaughter committed by an Indian in Indian country.
55
 As 
previously discussed, this charge was subject to the jurisdiction of the 
federal government under the Major Crimes Act.
56
 The indictment claimed 
Flute “unlawfully kill[ed] Baby . . . Flute by ingesting prescribed and over-
the-counter medicines in a grossly negligent manner, and did thereby 
commit the crime of involuntary manslaughter.”
57
 Following the 
indictment, Flute filed a motion to dismiss, arguing her actions did not fit 
the conduct of the offense under the FIMA; she argued that an unborn child 




The District Court for the District of South Dakota granted Flute’s 
motion to dismiss on the basis that she was not within the class of 
defendants the FIMA sought to criminalize.
59
 More specifically, the court 
found through statutory interpretation that the FIMA was not applicable to a 
woman and her unborn child.
60
 The prosecution appealed this dismissal, 
arguing the district court’s statutory interpretation of the FIMA was 
incorrect; to the district court’s understanding, the FIMA does, in fact, 




On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered two separate issues. The first 
issue was whether babies who die shortly after birth due to injuries 
sustained while they were in utero—such as Baby Flute—are included in 
the class of victims the FIMA seeks to protect.
62
 The court also considered 
whether mothers who cause the death of their child after birth through 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a); see Flute, 929 F.3d at 586–87. 
 57. Redacted Indictment, supra note 9. 
 58. Flute, 929 F.3d at 586 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a)).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 587. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
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Regarding the first issue, the Eighth Circuit determined that babies such 
as Baby Flute are within the class of victims recognized under the FIMA.
64
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit conducted a statutory 
interpretation analysis to determine what class of victims the Act was 
intended to protect.
65
 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Flute’s contention 
that the Act did not apply to her because, at the time of her actions that 
caused Baby Flute’s later death, Baby Flute was not yet a human being.
66
 
Citing to the BAIPA, the Eighth Circuit noted that “human being,” as it 
relates to any act of Congress, “include[s] every infant member of the 
species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.”
67
 The 
BAIPA defines “born alive” to mean that an infant was completely expelled 
or extracted from his or her mother with a beating heart.
68
 The Eighth 
Circuit considered this Act in conjunction with the FIMA, and concluded 
that Baby Flute was a human being for purposes of the FIMA.
69
 
Baby Flute survived only hours after his birth before the drugs in his 
system caused his death.
70
 Under the court’s analysis, Baby Flute fit within 
the purview of the BAIPA because he was alive following the complete 
expulsion from his mother.
71
 The court reasoned that, because the BAIPA 
was created with the intention to apply to all acts of Congress, a born-alive 
child whose death is caused after birth by in utero injuries falls within the 
victims protected by the FIMA.
72
 
The court noted that this interpretation of the FIMA was consistent with 
the common law “born alive” rule, “whereby liability extend[s] to the death 
of a child born alive related to injuries received in utero.”
73
 The court only 
considered whether Baby Flute was a human being at the time of death 
when considering the application of the FIMA.
74
 “[H]omicide does not 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 588. 
 65. Id. at 587–88. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 588 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 8 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 68. Id.; see also infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 69. Flute, 929 F.3d at 588. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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occur unless and until the victim actually dies.”
75
 “[B]ecause death 
completes the offense of manslaughter, the victim’s status at death” is the 
most important factor to consider, “rather than the victim’s status when the 
injuries were sustained.”
76
 Given that Baby Flute was considered a “human 
being” at the time of his death, and even if the injuries which caused death 
occurred prior to his birth, he and similar victims fall within the protection 
of the FIMA according to the Eighth Circuit.
77
  
On the second issue—whether Flute falls within the class of defendants 
referenced in the FIMA—the Eighth Circuit found that the mother of a 
child who is born alive but then subsequently dies due to the mother’s 
negligent conduct while the child was in utero is criminally culpable under 
the Act.
78
 Although the district court originally found that conduct such as 
Flute’s was excluded from the FIMA due to an exception for mothers of 
unborn children, the Eighth Circuit disagreed.
79
 The district court based this 
exception on the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which “criminalizes the 
killing or injuring of unborn children during the commission of certain 
federal offenses.”
80
 The Unborn Victims of Violence Act creates offenses 
for people who engage in the enumerated crimes, including involuntary 
manslaughter, that result in the death of “a child, who is in utero at the time 
the conduct takes place.”
81
 This Act does not include conduct committed by 
“any woman with respect to her unborn child.”
82
 The district court 
concluded that the exception provided in the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act was a “clear statement from Congress that the federal assault and 
murder statutes cannot be applied to the pregnant woman herself for any 
actions she takes with respect to her unborn child.”
83
 The Eighth Circuit, on 
the other hand, found this interpretation to be erroneous.
84
 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act’s 
exception “has no applicability or reach beyond its own provisions.”
85
 The 
Eighth Circuit found that the plain language of the Unborn Victims of 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 588–89. 
 78. Id. at 589. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1086 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 81. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 82. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 83. United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *3 (D.S.D. 
Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 84. Flute, 929 F.3d at 589. 
 85. Id. 
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Violence Act made it clear that the exceptions of the statute applied only to 
that specific statute and not to any unrelated statutory provisions, such as 
the FIMA.
86
 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress did not 
intend for the exception for mothers and their conduct affecting their 
unborn children found in the Unborn Victims of Violence Act to be applied 
broadly to other statutory provisions.
87
 The court stated that it “will not read 
an exception into a statutory provision where it does not exist.”
88
 Because 
there was no applicable exception found for mothers and their own 
children, the court considered no other information in finding that Flute was 
within the class of defendants criminalized by the FIMA.
89
 Additionally, 
the Eighth Circuit noted that the district court was erroneous when it based 
its holding on “the potential ramifications of applying the federal 
involuntary manslaughter statute” in this instance.
90
 Since the plain 
meaning of the statue answered the issue in contention, the Eighth Circuit 
believed no other considerations should play a part in the analysis.
91
 
Based on the plain language of the statute, the Eighth Circuit found that 
Flute was “an appropriate defendant within the scope of [the FIMA] and 
may be criminally charged for her conduct . . . ultimately resulting in Baby 
Flute’s death after birth.”
92
 According to the Eighth Circuit, federal 
involuntary manslaughter includes the killing of “human beings” which, in 
light of the BAIPA, includes children who are born alive.
93
 Additionally 
within this reasoning, the FIMA includes no exception for a mother’s 
conduct, criminalizing negligent behavior of mothers that harms their child 




                                                                                                             
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 589–90. 
 90. Id. at 589. 
 91. See id. at 590. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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IV. Analysis of the United States v. Flute Decision and Its Implications for 
Native American Women 
A. Can a Mother’s Prenatal Actions Constitute Federal Involuntary 
Manslaughter? 
The Flute district court’s interpretation of the FIMA corresponds with 
congressional intent for the Act, prior precedent, and policy concerns. 
However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
interpretation and application of the Act.
95
 Finding that the plain meaning 
of the statute showed no ambiguity nor exceptions for a mother’s actions 
toward her child in utero, the Eighth Circuit performed no further statutory 
interpretation in holding that Flute’s actions constituted involuntary 
manslaughter.
96
 The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the plain meaning of 
the FIMA as applied in these circumstances is not in line with Congress’ 
intent for the Act; thus, the intent of the drafters should instead be the 
controlling interpretation. 
There is no discrepancy between the decision of the lower court and 
appeals court over whether Baby Flute was considered to be a human being 
for the purposes of the Act. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit 
found that, due to the definition of “human being,” Baby Flute fell within 
the class of victims that the FIMA sought to protect.
97
 The courts, however, 
did not agree as to whether a mother’s actions taken against her unborn 
child qualified her as a defendant that Congress sought to criminalize.
98
 
In order to ascertain the meaning of a statute, a court may use the canons 
of construction as a rule of thumb, but should turn to the first canon of 
construction before all others.
99
 Thus, in determining the meaning of a 
statute, a court should first look at the “language in which the act is 
framed.”
100
 If the language of the act is plain, then “the sole function of the 
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”
101
 As a general rule, courts 
should presume “that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says there.”
102
 In interpreting a statute, a court should 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. at 589. 
 96. Id. at 590. 
 97. United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *2 (D.S.D. 
Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019); Flute, 929 F.3d at 590. 
 98. Flute, 2017 WL 5495170, at *4; Flute, 929 F.3d at 590. 
 99. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 100. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54. 
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consider not only the bare meaning of words and phrases but also their 
broader meaning within the statutory scheme as a whole.
103
 Words in 
isolation are not always controlling in light of the statutory construction 
because “[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of 
its definitional possibilities.”
104
 Interpretation of the meaning of a statute 
depends on the interpretation of the statue as a whole giving value to both 




Albeit rare, there are cases where “the literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.”
106
 
Interpretations in conflict with the intentions of drafters occur where the 
plain meaning creates a conflict with another section of the code, is 
contrary to an important state or federal interest, or is contrary to the view 
suggested by legislative history.
107
 In such cases, the intentions of the 
drafters, rather than the plain language, “must be controlling.”
108
  
On its face, the FIMA seems to have an unambiguous plain meaning, 
especially in light of the BAIPA. The FIMA defines manslaughter as “the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice.”
109
 Further, 
manslaughter is considered to be involuntary when the unlawful killing 
occurs “[i]n the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, 
or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and 
circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.”
110
 For the 
purposes of federal legislation, a human being is defined to “include 
every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any 
stage of development.”
111
 Further, “born alive” means: 
the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother . . . 
at any stage of development, who after such expulsion or 
extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the 
                                                                                                             
 103. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6 (1999) (quoting Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)) (explaining that in statutory interpretation courts 
“‘consider not only the bare meaning’ of the critical word or phrase ‘but also its placement 
and purpose in the statutory scheme.’”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). 
 107. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989). 
 108. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571; see also Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). 
 110. Id. 
 111. 1 U.S.C. § 8(a). 
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umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles . . . 
regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a 




As the Eighth Circuit noted, given the plain meaning of the Act in 
conjunction with the definition of “human being,” Flute’s conduct seems to 
constitute involuntary manslaughter.
113
 The court, however, inaccurately 
found no conflict between the intention of the FIMA’s drafters and the 
literal application of the Act when applied to mothers for their fatal prenatal 
actions. The Act is one of the rare cases where the intentions of the drafters, 
rather than the plain meaning, should be controlling. 
Congress never intended for the Act to apply to mothers for their 
prenatal actions, as evidenced by prior precedent, legislative history, and 
policy concerns. Prior precedent shows that “the government has never 
before charged a mother with manslaughter based on prenatal neglect that 
causes the death of [her] child.”
114
 In addition to the fact that the Act has 
never been applied in this way, the legislative history points to an 
interpretation alternative to the one that the Eighth Circuit adopted.  
Congress passed the BAIPA in 2001 in response to developing case law 
allowing partial-birth abortions.
115
 Through the Act, Congress sought to 
protect living infants completely expelled from their mothers.
116
 For 
instance, the legislative history states that this Act would protect an infant 
“born alive at a Federal hospital as a result of a failed abortion attempt” so 
doctors would be required to treat the born alive infant “as they would treat 
a similarly-situated infant who was born as a result of natural labor.”
117
 
History makes clear that Congress intended this Act to protect infants from 
criminal conduct after birth, despite the manner or point in development at 
which they are born. Applying the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
BAIPA goes against the intentions of the drafters. The opponents of the Act 
foresaw that it would likely be misconstrued by noting that the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that “[b]ecause the words 
‘person, human being, child, and individual’ are used frequently throughout 
the United States Code, CBO cannot determine how the new definitions 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. § 8(b). 
 113. United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 114. Id. at 591 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
 115. H.R. REP. NO. 107–186, at 2–3 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 620, 620–
22, 2001 WL 873624. 
 116. Id. at 12, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 631. 
 117. Id. at 13, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 632. 
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could be interpreted in all situations.”
118
 This interpretation of the Eighth 
Circuit is exactly what the opponents of the BAIPA feared. The Eight 
Circuit applied the Act in a way likely not foreseen by Congress, due to the 
expansive application of the Act to all federal law. The BAIPA was 
directed at criminal conduct after birth. The Eight Circuit’s interpretation of 
this Act, however, inappropriately expanded it to cover criminal conduct 
before birth. 
The legislative history of a subsequent act makes clear that Congress has 
no intention for the FIMA to apply to a mother’s action against her child in 
utero. Two years after the enactment of the BAIPA, the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act was passed. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act further 
clarified that Congress never intended the BAIPA to apply to actions 
against an infant in utero. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act criminalizes 
anyone who “engage[d] in conduct that violate[d] any of the provisions of 
law listed in subsection (b) and thereby cause[d] the death of, or bodily 
injury . . . to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct t[ook] 
place . . . .”
119
 Involuntary manslaughter is one of the specific offenses 
listed in subsection (b) of the Act, but it explicitly states that it should not 
be construed to “permit the prosecution . . . of any woman with respect to 
her unborn child.”
120
 Additionally, legislative history notes that the Act 
sought to abolish the now-medically unnecessary born alive rule.
121
 The Act 
instead “ensures that Federal prosecutors are able to punish those who 
injure or kill unborn children during the commission of violent Federal 
crimes, whether or not the child is fortunate enough to survive the attack 
and be born alive.”
122
  
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act alone specifically criminalizes acts 
against a child in utero. The Act abolished the born alive rule and makes 
clear that Congress did not intend to criminalize the acts of mothers with 
respect to their unborn child, even if the language of FIMA and the BAIPA 
seemingly point to the contrary. Congress did not foresee the Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation when it broadly applied the new definition of 
“human being” to all federal legislation. The Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act clearly shows Congress did not intend the BAIPA to apply in the 
manner prescribed by the Eighth Circuit. 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. at 16, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 634.  
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
 120. Id. § 1841(c). 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, pt. 1, at 6–7 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 533, 
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Finally, policy considerations support the interpretation of the FIMA 
adopted by the district court, rather than the Eighth Circuit. Although policy 
considerations should not be the driving factor of statutory interpretation,
123
 
they may be considered if they point to ways in which the plain meaning of 
the statute is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters.
124
 The 
interpretation of the Eighth Circuit would allow women to be prosecuted 
under the FIMA for many different actions when those actions cause the 
prenatal harm and later death of their “born alive” infant.
125
 Under the 
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation, a pregnant woman who caused a car 
accident through negligent driving, “use[d] chemotherapy to treat cancer,” 
or neglected prenatal care that resulted in the injury or death of her unborn 
child, could all likely be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter.
126
 There 
is no evidence that Congress intended any such instances to be considered 




Congress never intended for the FIMA to be extended to criminalize the 
prenatal actions of a pregnant woman that cause the death of her child, even 
if that child is born alive. The strict reading of the FIMA and the BAIPA 
goes against Congress’ intent, as evidenced by legislative history and 
subsequent acts. In addition, it goes against precedent as this is a conviction 
of first impression at the federal level. Lastly, the Eighth Circuit’s strict 
reading goes against policy as it would have sweeping adverse effects on 
pregnant women; one distinct policy consideration reflected in the 
particular facts of Flute is that the interpretation adopted by the Eighth 
Circuit will have a disproportionate effect on Native American women. 
Because of the many unfortunate circumstances Native American women 
are disproportionately exposed to, they will also be more likely to find 
themselves in Flute’s position.  
                                                                                                             
 123. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) (“[C]ourts do not substitute 
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to 
pass laws . . . . We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 124. Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242–43 (1989) (holding that 
because there was no evidence of contradictory legislation, contradictory federal or state 
interests, contradictory legislative history, nor compelling policy reasons of the statute at 
hand, the statute must be interpreted strictly by the language rather than the intentions of the 
drafters.). 
 125. See United States v. Flute, No. 1:17-CR-10017-CBK, 2017 WL 5495170, at *3 
(D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019). 
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B. The Disproportionate Effects of the Flute Decision on Native American 
Women 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Unites States v. Flute will 
disproportionately affect Native American women. Native American 
women are exposed to limited access to women’s healthcare, heightened 
rates of addiction, and infant mortality at a much higher rate than non-
Indian women.
128
 These conditions make it more likely that a Native 
American woman would be adversely affected by the holding. Particularly, 
Native American women struggling with addiction, like Samantha Flute, 
may face criminal prosecution under the FIMA more frequently than non-
Indian women due to the unavailability of abortion services within the 
Indian Health Service, caused by the Hyde Amendment. 
Many Native Americans view healthcare provided by the United States 
as a right created by treaties rather than a privilege.
129
 Healthcare, through 
the Indian Health Service, was a stipulation in many of the treaties by 
which the United States took land from Native Americans.
130
 Due to the 
high rate of poverty in Native American communities, private healthcare is 
rare.
131
 Thus, the Indian Health Service is the primary healthcare provider 
for most Native Americans.
132
 Despite this service, Native Americans 
experience low access rates to adequate healthcare.
133
 Native American 
women, in particular, do not have access to reproductive healthcare services 
that are available to most of the American population. These inaccessible 
                                                                                                             
 128. Brief for National Advocates for Pregnant Women & Other Experts in Medicine, 
Public Health & Policy as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee’s Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc at 19, United States v. Flute, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-
3727), 2019 WL 4132202, at *12 [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (“Native people are 
disproportionately impacted by poverty, lack access to adequate healthcare and have much 
higher rates of infant mortality . . . .”); Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the 
shortage of health professionals on reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to 
“adequately address the health needs of local Native Americans.”); id. at 406 (“Nearly 
nineteen percent of Native Americans ages twelve and older reported using illegal drugs 
compared to just under twelve percent of the general U.S. population.”). 
 129. Leslie Logan, Abortion: Native Women Respond to Onslaught of Laws and 
Restrictions Across the Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 3, 2019), 
https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/abortion-native-women-respond-to-
onslaught-of-laws-and-restrictions-across-the-country-V0qDwW-tZ0mY1q3KZozxAw. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 407 (explaining the shortage of health professionals on 
reservations and the Indian Health Service’s failure to “adequately address the health needs 
of local Native Americans”). 
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reproductive services include “access to . . . abortion[s], emergency 
contraception, and sometimes even condoms.”
134
 
After the Hyde Amendment was applied to the Indian Health Service, 
Native American women could no longer receive abortions in this setting 
unless their health was in danger.
135
 “The law’s impact is particularly 
devastating to poor women and discriminates against women who often 
need [these] abortion services the most: those who have reduced access to 
family planning, and experience higher rates of sexual victimization.”
136
 
Although the Hyde Amendment applies broadly to all federally funded 
healthcare, it disproportionately affects Native American women; federally 




Even with permissible abortions under the Hyde Amendment, such as 
when the mother’s health is in danger or in cases where the pregnancy was 
caused by rape or incest, Native American women often are not given 
abortion services that could be legally provided by the Indian Health 
Service.
138
 A survey of Indian Health Service units showed that, 
specifically in cases where the mother’s health was “endangered by the 
pregnancy,” 62% of the units surveyed “do not provide either abortion 
services or funding.”
139
 In Flute’s home state of South Dakota, a 2003 
report stated that it was difficult for a woman to obtain abortion services 
outside of the Indian healthcare system.
140
 At the time of the report, there 
was only one private abortion clinic in South Dakota.
141
 Because of the 
Hyde Amendment and inadequate healthcare provided by the Indian Health 
Service, Native American women are less likely to get the reproductive 
healthcare treatment they need. 
                                                                                                             
 134. Logan, supra note 129. 
 135. Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 94–439, sec. 209, 90 
Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976); Act of Oct. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-369, sec. 110, 94 Stat. 1351, 
1356 (providing continuing appropriations for the fiscal year of 1981). 
 136. Logan, supra note 129. 
 137. Id. 
 138. KATI SCHINDLER ET AL., NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR., 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE AND ITS 
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE HYDE AMENDMENT 5 (2002), http://prochoice.org/ 
pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/indigenous_women.pdf (“[S]urvey 
findings showed that 85% of the surveyed Service Units were noncompliant with the official 
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Most likely due to the inadequacy of reproductive healthcare on 
reservations, Native American women are “more likely to experience . . . 
neonatal loss.”
142
 Native American women face a much higher rate of infant 
mortality—“9.4 per 1,000 live births”—compared “to the overall national 
[infant mortality] rate of 5.8” per 1000 live births.
143
 Although the cause of 
infant mortality may vary, these high rates are yet another factor that makes 
it more likely that Native American women will be disproportionately 
affected by the Flute holding. 
In addition to having low access to adequate healthcare, Native 
Americans face a higher rate of drug addiction than the population at 
large.
144
 A 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health report found that 
17.5% of American Indians and Alaskan Natives were in need of alcohol or 
illicit drug use treatment, compared to only 9.3% for other races and 
ethnicities.
145
 Additionally, data collected by the Indian Health Service 
reported that, in 2009, the death rate of American Indians and Alaskan 
Natives for drug-related deaths was 22.7%.
146
 This number is compared to a 
drastically smaller number of drug-related death rates of all races—
12.6%—in the United States.
147
 Even in the face of addiction, Native 
American women do not have access to abortions because of the Hyde 
Amendment. Native American women who suffer with addiction, much 
like Flute, have little to no option other than to carry their pregnancy to 
term and increase the likelihood that they will be subject to prosecution 
under the FIMA as a result of the Flute decision. 
  
                                                                                                             
 142. Amicus Brief, supra note 128. 
 143. Id. (citing Infant Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/infantmortality.htm (Sept. 10, 
2020)). 
 144. Fusselman, supra note 25, at 406 (“Nearly nineteen percent of Native Americans 
ages twelve and older reported using illegal drugs compared to just under twelve percent of 
the general U.S. population.”) 
 145. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Need for and Receipt of 
Substance Use Treatment Among American Indians or Alaska Natives, NSDUH REPORT, 
Nov. 2012, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH120/NSDUH120/SR 
120-treatment-need-AIAN.htm. 
 146. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., TRENDS IN INDIAN HEALTH 192 
(2014 ed.), https://www.ihs.gov/sites/dps/themes/responsive2017/display_objects/docu 
ments/Trends2014Book508.pdf. 
 147. Id. 
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The Eighth Circuit’s extension of the FIMA—to include the negligent 
actions of pregnant mothers where those actions later caused the death of 
their “born alive” child—is inconsistent with Congress’ intentions for the 
Act. The Eighth Circuit turned a blind eye to both Congress’ intentions of 
the FIMA that were at odds with its reading of the FIMA and to the drastic 
implications of its decision. 
The Eighth Circuit erroneously ignored the broad consequences the 
holding will have on women. Although policy considerations cannot be the 
driving force in interpretation, the Eighth Circuit refused to consider the 
implication of its holding at all. The holding in United States v. Flute puts 
many women at risk for prosecution for negligent actions. But, in particular, 
the holding will disproportionately affect Native American women because 
of the conditions they are inherently exposed to. Native American women 
already face inadequate and meager women’s reproductive healthcare, high 
rates of addiction, and high rates of infant mortality. If the FIMA is applied 
in accordance with the Eighth Circuit’s holding throughout the country, 
many women will face prosecutions for actions that have not previously 
been criminalized.  
The Flute decision increases the many barriers that women face because 
of their reproductive health. These barriers are even greater for Native 
American women who have experienced deep-rooted oppression. This 
oppression contributes to the disproportionate effect of the Flute decision 
on Native American women and the oppressions are further solidified by 
the decision itself. This oppression is something that neither society nor the 
courts and legislature should support.  
United States v. Flute is more than just an incorrectly decided case. It 
jeopardizes the future of all women—especially Native American women. 
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